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In a Volunteer’s Dilemma (VoD) one individual needs to bear a cost so that a public
good can be provided. Expectations regarding what others will do play a critical role
because they would ideally be negatively correlated with own decisions; yet, a social-
projection heuristic generates positive correlations. In a series of 2-person-dilemma
studies with over 1,000 participants, we find that expectations are indeed correlated with
own choice, and that people tend to volunteer more than game-theoretic benchmarks
and their own expectations would allow. We also find strong evidence for a social-
distance heuristic, according to which a person’s own probability to volunteer and
the expectation that others will volunteer decrease as others become socially more
remote. Experimentally induced expectations make opposite behavior more likely, but
respondents underweight these expectations. As a result, there is a small but systematic
effect of over-volunteering among psychologically close individuals.
Keywords: social dilemma, prosociality, expectation, rationality
INTRODUCTION
“That love as such may be unable to settle a conflict can be shown by considering a harmless test case,
which may pass as representative of more serious ones. Tom likes the theater and Dick likes dancing.
Tom lovingly insists on going to a dance while Dick wants for Tom’s sake to go to the theater. This
conflict cannot be settled by love; rather, the greater the love, the stronger will be the conflict. There
are only two solutions; one is the use of emotion, and ultimately of violence, and the other is the use of
reason, of impartiality, of reasonable compromise.”
Sir Karl Popper (1945/2011, p. 441)
Surviving and flourishing in the natural and the cultural world requires decision-making skills.
In games against nature, humans and other animals seek to do whatever ensures the survival
of their physical selves and the genes they carry (Buss, 1999). They need to forage efficiently in
environments characterized by uncertainty, scarcity, and an indifference to their welfare. In social
games, which often involve self-interested and only sometimes empathic conspecifics, humans
need to predict what these others will do when they know that these others are also trying to figure
out what they themselves will do (Hoffrage and Hertwig, 2012). Social games demand the kind of
strategic reasoning that generates and makes use of expectations in a dynamical way. These games
demand – as Popper realized – reason, impartiality, and compromise.
What sort of reason is it? Game theory offers a formal paradigm for the description of social
games or dilemmas and for derivations of rational choice (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1947; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Binmore, 2007). Orthodox game theory does not face the problem
of expectation squarely; it finesses the problem of other minds by defining it away. Consider
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game-theory’s iconic game, the prisoner’s dilemma, or PD. The
person (or ‘agent’ or ‘player’) who is rational in the game-
theoretic sense defects, hoping perhaps – though not expecting –
that others will cooperate. This player recognizes defection as the
dominating strategy. Whatever the other player (in a 2-person
game) does, this player fares better defecting. Unilateral defection
pays more (or penalizes less) than bilateral cooperation, and
bilateral defection pays more than unilateral cooperation. To find
the rational response, the player only needs to subtract one payoff
from another, do this twice, and note that the ordinal result is the
same. In other words, the player only needs to understand that
defection is the “sure thing” (Tversky and Shafir, 1992). As the
direction of the difference is the same regardless of the expected
probability of the other player cooperating (or defecting), the
concept of expectation drops out.
Noting the psychological barrenness of classic game theory
and worrying about its limited descriptive success (i.e.,
the finding that many reasonable people cooperate in the
PD), revisionist theorists have reintroduced expectations as a
necessary determinant of rational choice (Pruitt and Kimmel,
1977; Monterosso and Ainslee, 2003; Rapoport, 2003). Research
has shown that many individuals cooperate on the condition that
there is evidence or a good expectation that the other person
will also cooperate (Gintis, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Nielsen
et al., 2014).
A related line of research suggests that many individuals
expect others to choose the same strategy that they themselves
will choose, and that they therefore end up choosing cooperation
(Fischer, 2009; Krueger, 2013, 2014). According to this alternative
perspective on social dilemmas, the generation of behavioral
expectations and their effects on own choice is neither
unnecessary nor irrational. Since the days of Pascal (1995/1669)
and Bernoulli (1954/1738), the multiplicative integration of
expectations and values (i.e., payoffs) lies at the heart of most
theories of rational choice (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein, 2008). These
theories assume that people are either able to multiply and that
they choose well, or that at least their choices fit the predictions
made from explicit multiplications of expectations and values,
that is, people act at least as if they were making the requisite
calculations (Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010).
The research we report in this article is concerned with the
volunteer’s dilemma, or VoD, which belongs to a class of games
in which rational agents would wish to choose opposite strategies.
These dilemmas are known as anti-coordination games. Here
each player’s goal is to mismatch the other player’s strategy,
which raises particular psychological challenges (Abele et al.,
2014). As in other social dilemmas (including the PD), there is
a choice between one strategy that favors the self and another
strategy that favors the other person or the group (Archetti
and Scheuring, 2011). The outcome depends both on one’s own
choice and the choice of the other, and there is an inequality:
the individual and the collective outcome of mutual cooperation
are better than the outcome of mutual defection (Dawes, 1980;
Krueger et al., 2016). Yet, there is an incentive to defect, which
raises the specter of the destructive outcome of mutual defection
(Hardin, 1968). Whereas the structure of the PD makes it easy
for the game-theoretic rationalist to understand that defection
dominates cooperation, the VoD offers no dominating strategy.
This feature is a definitional property of games that yield best
results when the two agents choose different strategies, such as
the game of chicken (Rapoport and Chammah, 1966, which is
also know as the hawk-dove game, or its multi-player extension,
the crowding game; Alpern and Reyniers, 2001). Game theory
responds to this challenge with the concept of the mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium, which is designed to withhold from the other
person any incentive to change strategy. Again, expectations are
unnecessary for the derivation of the Nash equilibrium strategy.
Consider the structure of the VoD as displayed in Figure 1.
Volunteering yields the outcome (or payoff) “R,” which stands
for “Reward” (after Rapoport, 1967). R is obtained regardless
of the other player’s choice. Defection yields payoff “T” (for
“Temptation”) if the other player volunteers, but payoff “P”
(“Penalty”) if the other defects. There is a social dilemma because
T > R > P. Situations satisfying the definition of the VoD
crop up throughout social life whenever a division of labor and
responsibility is not regulated by contract or custom. Lecturers,
for example, hope for a student to volunteer to speak in class and
thereby ignite discussion; victims of emergency hope that one
person will help; soldiers on the battlefield sometimes need one
comrade who will accept the riskiest mission so that the others
may live.
When communication and coordination are impossible, each
individual must decide independently what to do. Diekmann
(1985) derived the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium probability
of volunteering as (R − P)/(T − P). The difference R − P
can be thought of as the psychic benefit of volunteering, but
also as the potential cost of not volunteering. The difference
T − P represents the total cost of mutual defection, which is
the sum of T − R (i.e., the temptation to defect) and R − P.
We consider it psychologically implausible that people approach
FIGURE 1 | Payoff Matrix of the Volunteer’s Dilemma. Option A is to volunteer; Option B is to abstain.
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a social dilemma without wondering what other individuals will
do. Even an orthodox game theorist assumes (or expects) that a
Nash-playing person will assume that other individuals will do
likewise. This is a non-trivial expectation because even though
deviating from Nash cannot improve one’s own payoffs, it can
hurt the payoffs of the other (Krueger et al., 2016, unpublished).
In short, the game-theoretic approach postulates the belief in
common knowledge, which is tantamount to a multi-level shared
expectation (Thomas et al., 2014). Game theory assumes that
players are not motivated by malice and that they do not expect
others to be so motivated.
Expectations: The Social Projection
Hypothesis
The questions of whether people form expectations about others
in social dilemmas and whether such expectations affect strategic
decisions are separable. With regard to the first question, there
is empirical support for the idea that people form expectations
projectively: they think that others are likely to choose whichever
strategy they themselves prefer. Dawes et al. (1977) presented
evidence for this hypothesis (see also Messé and Sivacek, 1979)
and Dawes (1989) derived a Bayesian rationale for why people
should use their own strategic choice as a projective cue to predict
the choices of others, and proved by backward induction that
even a sample of one ought not be ignored lest a sample of any size
would have to be ignored. This logic is particularly compelling
in an information-poor environment such as an anonymous
one-shot social dilemma.
With regard to the second question, it has been argued that
once projection is admitted as a judgment heuristic, it cannot
be ignored as a decision heuristic (Krueger and Acevedo, 2005).
In the PD, for example, the rational expectation that most
others – by definition – are more likely to make the same
instead of a different choice will leave a person caught between
the prospects of mutual cooperation and mutual defection.
Being able to only predict mutuality by using the projection
heuristic, a self-interested player has no reason not to choose
cooperation. Choosing cooperation does not imply a magical
belief that the other person’s behavior can be influenced but
simply reflects respect for the statistical rule that one’s own
choice is diagnostic of the choices of most others (Krueger,
2013; Krueger and Acevedo, 2005; Krueger et al., 2012). Social
projection is beneficial in the PD because mutual cooperation is
best for both the individual and the group, whereas in the VoD,
projection is problematic because mutual cooperation (2R) is
worse than unilateral cooperation (T+R). Ideally, a player would
choose whichever strategy the other player is not choosing. If
Tom knows that Dick volunteers, Tom defects. If Tom knows
that Dick defects, Tom volunteers. The structure of the VoD
thus challenges the human tendency to project. A player who
volunteers and then estimates that the other player will also
volunteer will be dissatisfied with the prospect of mutual, that is,
inefficient, volunteering. A player who defects and then estimates
that the other player will also defect will be unhappy with
the prospect of mutual loss. In other words, these players find
themselves in Popper’s dilemma of love.
If the VoD does not reward social projection, one might think
that projection is low or even reversed in this dilemma. Our
working hypothesis, however, is that projection will be strong
nonetheless. We draw this hypothesis from past research, which
has shown that projection is a reliable social heuristic even under
conditions discouraging its use (Krueger and Clement, 1994;
Krueger, 2003). We predict that in the VoD players’ strategy
choices will be positively correlated with the choices expected of
others.1
Evolution: The Social Distance
Hypothesis
Classic game theory is not concerned with individual differences,
identity, or social categories. The theory does not simply happen
to ignore such variables. Its axioms affirm their irrelevance. There
is only one standard of rational choice, and everyone is assumed
to meet it. In contrast, social psychology and evolutionary
psychology recognize the relevance of prosocial motives and how
these motives are differentially activated by the nature of the
relationships between or among actors (Murphy and Ackermann,
2014; Kurzban et al., 2015). The broadest generalization emerging
from theory and data is that the probability of prosocial choice
decreases with social (or psychological or genetic) distance.
Hamilton’s (1964) theory of inclusive fitness provides an elegant
Darwinian rationale. Assuming that the survival of genes is the
ultimate adaptive coin, organisms will make sacrifices if and
only if the net effect on the survival of their genes is positive.
Prosocial behavior will therefore decrease as the beneficiaries
of these sacrifices become biologically more distant. In a classic
study, Burnstein et al. (1994) showed that people come to the aid
of close over distant kin in hypothetical life-and-death scenarios,
whereas less serious contexts activate social norms concerning
need and deservingness. Genetic relatedness is difficult to display
and assess, and humans and other animals have evolved a range
of cues to honestly or deceptively signal relatedness (Dawkins,
1976). Perhaps the crudest way to differentiate between close and
distant others is to categorize them into ingroups and outgroups.
The general finding is that people like their ingroups more than
outgroups (Krueger and DiDonato, 2008), describe them in more
favorable terms, and – importantly – are more willing to help
ingroup than outgroup members in need (Rabbie and Horwitz,
1969; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; DiDonato et al., 2011).
From the perspective of biology, anthropology, and
psychology, “bounded prosociality” is a stylized fact (De
Dreu et al., 2015). Its robustness presents a challenge to
traditional game theory. There is much evidence to show that
people cooperate more readily with presumed ingroup members
than outgroup members in a variety of social dilemmas (Balliet
et al., 2014). Importantly, the increased willingness to cooperate
in the context of “parochial morality” comes with the expectation
that ingroup members, but not outgroup members, will also
cooperate (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000; Brewer, 2008). In
other words, differential projection (Robbins and Krueger, 2005)
1If there is support for the projection hypothesis in the VoD, we will have an
argument against the idea that people project strongly in the PD only in order to
rationalize their own cooperative desires.
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tends to be accurate. Extrapolating from this research, we
hypothesize that people’s readiness to volunteer and their
expectations that others will volunteer both diminish over social
distance. Although such a decline runs counter to the precepts
of traditional game theory, it is consistent with certain social
preference models of interdependent behavior (e.g., Van Lange,
1999; Fehr et al., 2005; Archetti, 2009).
Archetti (2009) developed a social-preference model to
quantitatively predict the probability of volunteering for
degrees of social distance. With our payoff notation, Archetti’s
(2009, p. 476) equation becomes pv = 1− T−R(T−P)· [1+(1−d)] . The
probability of volunteering, pv, increases as the temptation to
defect, T − R, or the cost of mutual defection, T − P, decrease
and as social distance, d, increases. The parameter d captures the
idea that the utility of volunteering is high to the extent that the
other person is socially or genetically close to the self. Consider
the payoffs in Figure 1, namely T = 2, R = 1, and P = 0. For
maximum distance (d = 1), we find that pv = 0.5, which is the
conventional Nash equilibrium. Neither orthodox game theory
nor a biologically informed social-preference theory would
assume a probability of volunteering below this benchmark.2 For
zero distance pv = 0.75. Here, the player weights the outcomes of
the other as much as his or her own outcomes, and if both players
do this, the sum of their outcomes is maximized. Note, however,
that this is not an equilibrium in the Nash sense. A player who
knows or expects the other to volunteer with a high pv might
choose to defect for sure and thereby increase his or her payoff
and reduce the other’s. In other words, using this ‘superrational’
strategy (Diekmann, 1985) requires the expectation that the other
player will do the same.
A Costly Error: The Over-Volunteering
Hypothesis
Our third hypothesis is more subtle and thus riskier. We
predict that many individuals will volunteer too much relative
to formal standards and relative to the implications of their
own expectations regarding others’ choices. They will, in other
words, stumble into Popper’s dilemma of love. How might
this happen? We submit that the social-distance heuristic is
frugal in the sense that it has no non-monotonic provisos
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). There is no check as to
whether there may be too much volunteering. Not having
such a proviso works well in social dilemmas where mutual
cooperation is the most efficient collective strategy (i.e., were
2R > T + P [or T + S]). In the VoD, however, heuristically
thinking individuals may choose to volunteer for a very close
other without working out the implications. As both individuals
have this tendency, the outcome is inefficient. In other words, we
predict that Archetti’s social preference model will offer a good
description of volunteering over social distance, but that against
this background of adaptiveness, there will be a systematic error
precisely where individuals would want to avoid it the most.
2This prediction refers to group averages. It is conceivable to find strict defectors
whose primary goal is to exploit the other, or, equivalently, to ensure not to earn a
lower payoff than the other.
When adding expectations to the picture, the possibility of
over-volunteering becomes more poignant. If, as we hypothesize,
people will be most likely to volunteer when the other is
psychologically close, and if, as we also hypothesize, people
project their own choices most strongly onto those who are
close, then we will find that respondents over-volunteer even by
the lights of their own expectations of reciprocity. To illustrate
this hypothesis, imagine a pair of siblings. Both want to ‘do the
right thing’ and sacrifice for the other. At the same time, they
predict that their sibling is equally willing to make that sacrifice.
Yet, they choose to volunteer. This outcome, if obtained, would
suggest that projective predictions are difficult to alter. The player
cannot escape the dilemma by defecting because this would
suggest the worst personal and collective outcome. To avoid over-
volunteering, the person would have to find a way to predict
that the other person is less likely to volunteer than the self.
This, in turn, might be a difficult psychological maneuver because
it would suggest that the self is a more socially responsible
person than the other. In doing so, it would undermine the
perception of social closeness (there is, however, evidence for
such self-enhancement in volunteering, Heck and Krueger, 2016,
unpublished).
Research Overview
We tested these hypotheses in three studies. In study 1, we sought
to demonstrate the social-distance effect and provide evidence
for over-volunteering at very short social distances, as evaluated
against a game-theoretic standard. In study 2, we considered
a full range of social distances and introduced respondents’
expectations. Here, we tested all three hypotheses (social
projection, social distance, and over-volunteering) over multiple
samples. In study 3, we manipulated expectations experimentally.
Assuming that expectations are not epiphenomenal to behavior,
we predicted that respondents would consult expectations when
making a decision, but that the effect would be limited and result
in over-volunteering.
STUDY 1: SOCIAL DISTANCE AND
OVER-VOLUNTEERING
Undergraduate mostly female students (N = 250) in a 1st-
year lecture course on social psychology at a German-language
university in Switzerland took part in a classroom experiment. No
demographic data were collected. Students received instructions
over the microphone and were shown the following information
on a large screen. Instructions read that “the goal of this
experiment is to illustrate, with the help of your imagination, a
social dilemma, that is a game for at least two persons, in which
the consequences depend on the decisions of all participants.
You will be asked to make a hypothetical decision that may
entail that you or someone else will hypothetically receive an
electric shock. Participation is anonymous and voluntary.” Next,
participants were asked to imagine gradations of social distance
using a method developed by Jones and Rachlin (2006) which
asks participants to create a mental ranking of 100 people with
rank #1 corresponding to a close friend or relative and rank
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#100 corresponding to a superficial acquaintance (see below for
a detailed description of this method in the context of Study 2).
Then the payoff matrix of the VoD was shown and explained.
Students learned that they would receive 1 (hypothetical) electric
shock if they volunteered, receive no shock if they did not
volunteer while the other person did, and receive 2 shocks if
neither they nor the other person volunteered. That is, the payoffs
were T = 0, R= –1, and P = –2. This payoff structure is a simple
linear transformation of the canonical structure discussed earlier
and displayed in Figure 1. Using an online response interface, all
participants made two binary decisions to either select Option A
or Option B, which, respectively, amounted to volunteering and
defecting. They made the first decision under the presumption
that they were paired with the person of the lowest social distance
(person #1 on the ranked list), and they made the second decision
under the presumption of being paired with the person of the
greatest social distance (person #100 on the list).
The results supported the social distance and the over-
volunteering hypotheses. For the closest distance (rank #1),
87% volunteered. The 95% confidence interval, CI: [82; 91]
excluded the equilibrium value of 75%, which would maximize
joint outcomes. For the greatest distance (rank #100), 68%
volunteered, and the 95% CI [62; 73] excluded its corresponding
Nash equilibrium value of 50%, that is, the strategy of the rational,
self-interested individual.
This was first evidence for the social distance hypothesis.
Moreover, when compared with game-theoretic benchmarks,
there was evidence for over-volunteering not only for a
VoD involving close others but also involving distant others.
Expectations were neither measured nor manipulated and no
intermediate levels of social distance were considered. We
designed a multi-sample study to address these issues.
STUDY 2: A CONTINUUM OF SOCIAL
DISTANCE AND EXPECTATIONS
The goal of this study was to test the social distance, social
projection, and over-volunteering hypotheses in the context of
social expectations. We wanted to see whether people over-
volunteer (at close distance) even in light of their own expecations
regarding the other’s decision to volunteer. As discussed earlier,
this prediction followed from the social projection hypothesis.
In addition to tests of these three main hypotheses, the data
also allowed us to ask whether respondents tended to think that
they themselves were more likely to volunteer than others, and
whether such a tendency might be moderated by social distance.
If obtained, such a self-enhancement effect (“I volunteer more
than the other”; Heck and Krueger, 2015) would constrain over-
volunteering in the sense that it would make it less likely that
people would volunteer with a high probability and expect the
same from the other.
Methods
Participants
We recruited a total of 703 participants in five samples, two
of which came from a university campus in the Northeastern
United States. Sample 1 was collected in the spring of 2013 and
included 80 women and 80 men with a median age of 20 years.
Sample 2 was collected in the spring of 2014 and included 94
women and 114 men with a median age of 20 years. Sample 3
was collected in the summer of 2014 at a campus in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland. This sample included 62 men and
56 women (median age = 24). Samples 4 and 5 were collected in
the fall of 2014 during a lecture class at the same Swiss University.
Sample 4 (79 women and 26 men, median age = 21) received
a dilemma with positive payoffs, whereas Sample 5 (76 women
and 32 men, median age = 21) worked with negative payoffs
(see below). Assignment to Samples 4 or 5 was random. All five
samples shared nearly identical experimental procedures, which
allowed us to analyze the data using a single statistical model in
which the sample was entered as a potential moderator variable.
This method offered an internal test of replicability and provided
substantial statistical power (Schimmack, 2012). We describe the
procedure for the largest sample (i.e., Sample 2) and note where
the others differ.
Procedure
Participants were approached on an urban college campus
in the Northeastern United States. All agreed to complete a
brief survey on interdependent behavior. Each of 26 surveyors
recruited eight respondents. The recruiters were enrolled in a
laboratory course on social cognition, and they explained to
the respondents that the data were being collected for a class
project with the possibility of publication. Recruiters ensured
that each respondent was surveyed individually and in a quiet
location. The recruiter provided a sheet with instructions and
the survey itself in a printed packet. The surveyor stayed on
site, responded to questions of clarification, and thanked and
debriefed the respondents upon completion of the survey.
The procedure for Sample 3 was slightly different in that only
two surveyors recruited participants and no gender quota was
used. For Sample 1, there were 20 surveyors. Samples 4 and 5
were collected during a lecture class with five teaching assistants
distributing the questionnaires. Participants were promised
a presentation on the results in return for their voluntary
participation.
Materials
Instructions stated that the survey was designed “to tap into
students’ intuitions regarding how they would behave in a
situation in which they are interdependent with someone else.
That is to say, what course of action would you choose if the
outcome does not only depend on your choice but also someone
else’s.”
The survey had three pages. On the first page, the VoD was
described in neutral terms. Respondents were asked to “consider
an interpersonal setting that is currently popular in studies on
behavioral economics. The situation involves two individuals.
Think of yourself as Person 1 and the other person as Person
2. Person 2 is anonymous with the exception of one bit of
information, as you will see shortly. Both individuals must select
a response at the same time and without knowledge of the
other’s choice.” Next, the consequences of choosing Option A
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and Option B – by the respondent and the other person – were
described. Mutual selection of Option A would result in 1 painful
electric shock for each person and mutual selection of Option B
would result in two painful shocks for each person. If one person
selected Option A, while the other person selected Option B, the
former would receive 1 shock, while the latter would receive none.
This array of payoffs reflects the canonical volunteer’s dilemma;
Option A amounts to volunteering, Option B to abstaining (see
Figure 1 for a normal form representation of the game and
positive payoffs).
Next, the scale for social distance was introduced.
Respondents read a modified version of Jones and Rachlin’s
(2006) scale for the measurement of social distance. They were
asked “to imagine that you have made a list of the 100 people
closest to you in the world ranging from your dearest friend
or relative at position #1 to a mere acquaintance at #100. The
person at number one would be someone you know well and
is your closest friend or relative. The person at #100 might be
someone you recognize and encounter but perhaps you may
not even know their name. You do not have to physically create
the list—just imagine that you have done so.” Given this mental
scale, respondents were asked to “consider five individuals from
this hypothetical list (numbers 1, 25, 50, 75, and 100), and we will
ask for two judgments in each case. Please note that we consider
social distance to be symmetrical. However close or distant the
other is to you, so you are to the other.”
The second page began with instructions of how to make
probability judgments. To facilitate comprehension, the vivid
language of frequencies was used. “In situations like the one we
consider here, people might use different strategies. Suppose the
game were played a 100 times; a person might decide to select
Option A a certain number of times and Option B the rest of the
times. This number, X out of 100, can represent the probability
with which the person chooses Option A in a given individual
situation.”
Roughly half of the respondents were first asked to provide
judgments of the likelihood of their own choosing Option A,
whereas the other half were first asked to judge the likelihood
that the other person would choose Option A. Within each
of these two counterbalanced conditions, roughly half of the
respondents made ratings progressing from high to low social
distance, whereas the remainder progressed in the opposite
direction. These procedural variations did not have any effects on
the response variables, nor did they moderate the effects of social
distance. Thus, they were not further considered in Samples 4
and 5, in which we asked for the likelihood of their own choosing
Option A first and used a low to high order for social distance.
The materials for Samples 3, 4, and 5 were exact translations
of the materials for Sample 2. The main differences between
materials for Sample 1 and Sample 2 were that (a) the cooperative
response option was labeled “Volunteer” and the other option
was labeled “Abstain” for Sample 1, whereas the neutral labels
“Option A” and “Option B” were used for Sample 2, and (b) the
instructions for the probability judgment were more ambiguous
for Sample 1 in that participants were asked “How certain are
you that you would volunteer (vs. abstain)? Write in a percentage
value between 0 and 100.” A final difference was that the scenario
described in Sample 4 was not about an electric shock, but about
pleasant electrical stimulation. For example, participants were
told that if they chose Option A and the other player chose Option
B, they would receive one pleasant electrical stimulation and the
other player would receive two pleasant electrical stimulations.
To check comprehension, we asked participants in Sample 3
at the very end to go back to the probability of volunteering they
had stated for a randomly selected level of social distance, and
indicate the most likely outcome of a single game based on their
probability of volunteering and their expected probability of the
other player volunteering. Five options were given, namely the
four outcomes defined by the payoff matrix and all outcomes
equally probable. Due to an oversight we did not include the
case in which two of the outcomes would be most probable
(which would arise if either own probability of volunteering or
expectation was equal to 0.5). This led to ambiguities for 9 out of
117 participants (8%) who correctly selected one of the two most
probable outcomes. By treating these participants separately,
we estimate the level of comprehension conservatively. The
results reassured us that participants generally understood the
game. Correct answers were given by 73 participants (62%); 33
participants (28%) gave wrong answers, and 2 participants did
not answer the question.
Results
Analyses
Preliminary analyses revealed homogeneous results with the
exception of Sample 4, where outcomes were framed as gains.
We continue with analyses of the negative-frame VoD and
return to the findings from Sample 4 later. Figure 2 displays
the distributions of volunteering as bean plots, with their
widths reflecting the density of responses (Kampstra, 2008) at
specific levels of social distance. To account for the skew in the
data, we estimated standard errors and confidence intervals by
bootstrapping. We modeled heterogeneity in the average levels
of the response variables and the effects of social distance as
random effects, using linear mixed models algorithms provided
by the package lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) for the software R (R
Core Team, 2014). To obtain standardized effect sizes, we used
a function provided by LaHuis et al. (2014) which calculates the
approximate explained variance at Level 1.
The Probability of Volunteering
The means shown in Figure 2 (circles) support the social distance
hypothesis. Volunteering (choosing ‘Option A’) became less likely
as social distance increased. To model this trend, we regressed
the stated probability of volunteering on social distance (coded
from 1= lowest distance, to 5= highest distance). To account for
differences between samples, we used unweighted effects coding
with three indicator variables and their interactions with the
social distance variable. The intercepts and the effect of social
distance represent the unweighted mean intercept and slope,
respectively, for the whole dataset (i.e., all samples except for
Sample 4, see below).
The intercept of the regression was b= 89.47 and the slope was
b = −7.83, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) [−8.92, −6.69].
With each stepwise increase in social distance, the reported
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FIGURE 2 | Distributions of the probability of volunteering across social distance conditions in Study 2 (and 95% confidence intervals for the means).
The lower limit of the confidence interval for the second lowest social distance condition (71.84) excludes the equilibrium value (71.43).
probability of volunteering decreased by 7.83 percentage points.
The approximate explained variance at Level 1 was R2 = 24%.
The individual sample intercepts and slopes from the different
samples were not significantly different from the overall intercept
or slope (all |t| s < 1.49), which permits a joint analysis of the
data.
Further analysis revealed that almost all respondents became
less willing to volunteer as social distance increased. Only a few
individuals produced curvilinear patterns or positive regression
weights (such that the higher the social distance, the greater
the stated probability of volunteering). We will return to this
group when we examine the relationship between expectations
and volunteering.
Figure 2 also shows the game-theoretic benchmarks for the
probability of volunteering as a dotted line (Archetti, 2009).
These theoretical values fit the empirical data well. There is,
however, one noteworthy exception, and it corroborates the
hypothesis of over-volunteering. At the two shortest social
distances, respondents volunteered with a probability greater
than the probability that would maximize joint outcomes (if
used by both players). This mean-level difference underestimates
the prevalence of over-volunteering because of the skew in the
distribution. To understand how a randomly selected individual
participant would choose, the width of the beans provides
better guidance. For low social distance, the beans vividly
illustrate the excess prosociality. In the lowest and second-lowest
social distance conditions, 78 and 65% were over-volunteers,
respectively (i.e., volunteering with a probability greater than
the equilibrium value). The corresponding figures for those who
volunteered with certainty were 59 and 31%.
Expectations of Other’s Volunteering
We predicted that expectations regarding the other’s probability
of volunteering would also decrease over social distance,
and would thus be correlated with one’s own probability of
volunteering. Figure 3 shows that the data supported this
prediction. In a regression of expectation on social distance, the
intercept was b = 87.97 and the slope was b = −10.42, with a
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FIGURE 3 | Distributions of the expected probability of volunteering across social distance conditions in Study 2 (and 95% confidence intervals for
the means). For shortest social distance, the equilibrium value (75) is below the lower limit of the confidence interval (75.19).
95% CI [−11.41, −9.32]. The approximate explained variance
at Level 1 was R2 = 36%. Expected volunteering deteriorated
over social distance faster than own volunteering did, thereby
linking the size of the self-enhancement bias to social distance.
In all but the smallest social distance conditions, respondents
expected the other player to volunteer with a probability below
the equilibrium. Conversely, for the closest other person, they
expected others to volunteer above the equilibrium value. In
other words, respondents expected the closest other player to
volunteer with a greater probability than would be optimal for the
dyad, mirroring the results obtained for their own volunteering.
The implication is that respondents were willing to volunteer for
close others with a probability that was too high in light of their
own high expectations of those others volunteering.
The Relationship between Volunteering and
Expectations
We tested the social projection hypothesis by regressing own
volunteering on expected volunteering in a mixed model with
random intercepts. As predicted, the slope of this regression was
positive (b= 0.55, intercept= 34.95). The approximate explained
variance at Level 1 was R2 = 34%. Even when considering
only the data of the few participants who volunteered with a
higher probability as social distance increased (n = 85; 14%),
the slope was positive (b = 0.20, 95% CI [0.10, 0.29]). For these
individuals, the association between behavior and expectation
was weaker (p < 0.01) than for the majority (b = 0.61; 95%
CI [0.58, 0.64]). The respective values of approximate explained
variance at Level 1 were R2 = 1% for the subset of participants
with positive slopes and R2 = 44% for the majority. This is
strong support for the projection hypothesis. No matter which
way respondents changed their willingness to volunteer over
social distance, they expected others to do the same. Yet, the
minority of respondents showing a positive distance effect may
have had a poorer understanding of the game. In Sample 3, 73%
of the participants with a negative slope for the social distance
effect passed the comprehension check, whereas only 55% of
participants with a positive slope did.
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We assume that the correlation between own willingness
to volunteer and the volunteering expected from others arises
from processes of social projection rather than “introjective”
mechanisms that align one’s own decision with what is expected
of others. It is difficult to imagine how expectations might arise
without reference to one’s own behavioral inclination. Indeed,
if it were possible to construct such expectations early and
independently, then one’s own decision should be positively
matched with the expected behavior of the other only when social
distance is short; when individuals are paired with strangers, that
is, when they act only in their own self-interest, they should do the
opposite of what they expect the other to do. Yet, within each level
of social distance, we find positive associations between behavior
and expectation. When regressing expectations on decisions, the
slope was steepest for the shortest distance (b = 0.55; 95% CI
[0.49, 0.61]); R2 = 28%), but it was positive for the remaining
four levels too (overall b= 0.46; 95% CI [0.42, 0.49]; R2 = 22%).
Positive Outcomes
We returned to the data obtained in Sample 4, in which payoffs
were positive. Here, the slope of the regression of volunteering
on social distance was flatter than it was for negative outcomes
(b=−6.40, 95% CI [−9.12,−3.33]; R2 = 14%) and the intercept
lower (79.85). As a result, the mean value of volunteering at the
shortest social distance was 73.44, and the 95% CI [65.01, 81.07]
included the equilibrium value (75).
We obtained similar results for the expectations regarding
the probability of the other player volunteering in that the slope
was flatter and the intercept lower compared with the results for
negative outcomes (b=−6.69, 95% CI [−9.56,−3.54]; R2= 14%;
intercept b = 77.53). The mean value of expected probability of
the other player volunteering at the shortest distance was 70.84
and the 95% CI [62.66, 78.39] included the equilibrium value (75).
For the positive outcomes too, expectations predicted
volunteering (b = 0.84, intercept b = 12.11). With an
approximate explained variance at Level 1 of R2 = 73%, this effect
was much stronger than for negative outcomes. Within levels of
social distance, own decisions predicted expectations well, and
this relationship was again strongest when distance was short
(b = 0.99 and 0.89 for the first two levels and 0.70 thereafter
with respective values of explained variance R2 = 86, 77, and
61%). Again, the findings suggest that participants made their
own decisions to volunteer by consulting the available payoffs and
weighting them by social distance, and then assuming that others
would do the same.
Discussion
The results of this multi-sample study supported the main
hypotheses. In support of the social-projection hypothesis, we
found positive correlations between respondents’ willingness to
volunteer and their predictions of what the other person would
do. These correlations emerged for each level of social distance,
and they were strongest for short distances. It is worth noting
that some “differential projection” (Robbins and Krueger, 2005),
that is, a decrease of perceived similarities over social distance,
is warranted because actual similarities also tend to decrease.
Closely related and connected individuals share more similarities
than do mere strangers. Expecting such similarities in behavior
from one another is therefore a generally adaptive strategy.
As predicted, the willingness to volunteer and correspondent
expectations both decreased over social distance, thereby
allowing errors of over-volunteering to creep in. For the two
shortest social distances, willingness to volunteer exceeded
game-theoretic benchmarks. While this result suggests over-
volunteering, it is not yet definitive. Respondents might rationally
exceed these benchmarks if they (have reason to) believe that
the others are less likely to volunteer. The clearest case for over-
volunteering requires that both, own willingness to volunteer
and others’ expected willingness to volunteer, lie above the
benchmark. We find such evidence for the shortest social
distance.
Given the moral overtones of volunteering, we predicted and
found evidence of self-enhancement. At each level of social
distance, respondents claimed that they were, on average, more
willing to volunteer than the other person. The self-enhancement
bias is not a striking discovery on its own, but it is relevant
in that it makes over-volunteering more difficult to detect.
Had self-enhancement been any stronger, volunteers would have
expected others to defect, in which case they would have expected
successful (anti-)coordination to the benefit of the other.
Following theory and research on social projection, we
submit that people construct expectations about others on the
basis of their own behaviors rather than vice versa (see Van
Veelen et al., 2016, for a comprehensive review of the evidence
for this claim and its boundary conditions). This causal flow
has good support in research on both social projection and
self-enhancement (Krueger, 2007; Heck and Krueger, 2015).
Yet, it is difficult to draw firm inferences in the VoD because,
as in other social dilemmas, decisions and expectations are
dynamically interdependent. To open a window into the potential
role of expectations on volunteering decisions, we manipulated
expectations in our final study. Induced expectations are
available before respondents make strategic decisions (Gaschler
et al., 2014). This design let us test two hypotheses: First,
expectations will inversely affect volunteering decisions. Second,
the effect of expectations will be smaller than full rationality
demands. A consequence of this underuse of expectations is
over-volunteering. Respondents will be willing to volunteer even
when they expect the other person to volunteer as well.
STUDY 3: THE CAUSAL EFFECT OF
EXPECTATION
We tested these hypotheses in a two-factorial repeated-measures
design, in which the social distance between the respondent
and the other person was either very low or very high, and
in which the respondent was either led to believe that the
other person was very likely or very unlikely to volunteer.
Besides anticipating a replication of the social distance effect,
we predicted that respondents would be more willing to defect
when the other was likely to volunteer than if the other was
unlikely to volunteer. In other words, we predicted an effect
of expectation contravening the direction seen in the two
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correlational studies. We had no reason to think that social
distance would moderate the size of this effect. A subtler and
riskier prediction was that the expectation effect would be smaller
than required by expected-value considerations. We induced
expectations so strong that a strictly value-maximizing person
would either defect (if expectation of other’s volunteering is high)
or volunteer (if expectation is low). We doubted that these floors
and ceilings would be empirically matched in size. Critically, we
predicted that the shortfall relative to the floor of no volunteering
would be greater than the shortfall relative to the ceiling of full
volunteering. Such an asymmetry would constitute evidence of
over-volunteering.
Method
We recruited 296 residents of the United States on Amazon
Mechanical Turk and collected no further demographic
information. Each participant received a small payment of
c75 and a lottery ticket for a $25 Amazon.com gift card. Each
participant responded to all four scenarios of the 2 (social
distance: high vs. low) by 2 (expectation: high vs. low) design.3
The structure of the VoD and the social distance scale were
introduced as in the previous studies, using a standard platform
(Qualtrics Research Suite [Survey software], 2014). Participants
were asked to consider only the closest (distance rank 1) and
the remotest person as a partner in the VoD (social distance
rank 100). For each dilemma, they were to assume either that
this person was very likely to volunteer (with a 80% chance)
or very unlikely to volunteer (20% chance). The order of the
four scenarios was randomized over participants in a 2 (distant
or closest partner first) × 2 (for the first partner: high or low
expectations first) × 2 (for the second partner: high or low
expectations first) design. Participants then entered their own
likelihood to volunteer using a percentage scale.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 shows the findings as bean plots with means and
confidence intervals. Visual inspection reveals clear evidence
for both the social distance hypothesis and the expectation
hypothesis. We again used linear mixed models with random
effects and bootstrapped confidence intervals for statistical
analysis and effect-coding (−0.5 and 0.5) for the predictor
variables social distance and expectation. The main effect of
social distance, b = −14.13, 95% CI [−10.84, −17.54], R2 = 3%,
indicated that participants were approximately 14% less likely to
volunteer for the distant other compared with the close other.
The main effect of expectation, b = −23.30, 95% CI [−18.52,
−28.08], R2 = 9%, indicated that participants were about 23%
less likely to volunteer when they expected the other to volunteer
with a probability of 80% vs. 20%. The interaction term was not
significant, b=−2.92, 95% CI [−8.64, 2.72], R2 < 0.1%.
The data also support the over-volunteering hypothesis. When
the other was expected to volunteer with an 80% probability, the
optimal response was to not volunteer at all. Yet, participants
3An additional manipulation asked respondents to either seek to maximize their
own payoffs or to maximize the joined payoffs. This manipulation had no effect on
the results and is henceforth ignored.
announced that they would volunteer with a 51 and 35%
probability, respectively, for the close and distant other (see
Figure 4). This is prima facie evidence for over-volunteering. Yet,
there was also the converse effect of undervolunteering when
the other was expected to volunteer with a 20% probability.
Although the optimal response was to volunteer with certainty,
participants announced that they would volunteer with a 72 and
60% probability, respectively, for the close and distant other.
The results of Study 3 replicate and extend the body of
correlational findings accumulated in Studies 1 and 2. The social
distance effect on volunteering is robust, consistent with the
ideas of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) and strong reciprocity
(Gintis, 2000). As the social distance heuristic uses a single cue,
it opens the door to predictable error. We have identified over-
volunteering as one such an error and we saw that respondents
violate their own expectations regarding the choices of others
when they arguably care the most about an efficient outcome.
Study 3 shows that this violation of expectation occurs not only
when these expectations are self-generated but also when they are
externally provided.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary and Review
Volunteer’s Dilemmas pervade social life, although they are rarely
recognized as such. Who will buy the wine for dinner? Who
will start work on the co-authored manuscript? Who will punish
the loafers and jaded bystanders (Przepiorka and Diekmann,
2013)? The VoD has received little research attention apart
from the specific issue of bystander intervention and apathy in
emergency situations (Darley and Latané, 1968; Krueger and
Massey, 2009; Fischer et al., 2011). We suspect that the VoD
is neglected because of the belief that it is easily resolved with
a little goodwill and coordination, particularly among kin and
the well-acquainted (Sir Karl Popper dissenting). Most research
remains focused on social cooperation in public-goods and
resource dilemmas involving unrelated strangers (Dawes, 1980;
Norenzayan et al., 2016). In those dilemmas, collective outcomes
continue to improve as more individuals contribute. In contrast,
the relationship between collective welfare and the frequency of
prosocial behavior is non-linear in the VoD. It is inefficient to
have more than one volunteer or to have none at all. This non-
linearity poses a psychological challenge. A prosocial person must
consider the risk of making a redundant and thus inefficient
contribution.4
An excess of prosociality can occur when individuals are
close and when the effects of volunteering or mutual failure
to volunteer are negative. Our principal explanation of this
finding is the idea that people use a social-distance heuristic
when deciding whether to accept the cost of volunteering.
They are willing to make a sacrifice to the extent that
the other person is socially, psychologically, or genetically
4The VoD is akin to a step-level public-good dilemma, in which a benefit is
provided to all once a threshold of contributive cooperation is reached. All
additional contributions are wasted.
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FIGURE 4 | Distributions of volunteering across conditions in Study 3 (and 95% confidence intervals for the means).
close to them. This heuristic works well in many contexts
of interdependence, providing adaptive advantages that are
recognized by evolutionary biologists and game theorists (e.g.,
Ferrière and Michod, 2011; Locey et al., 2013). Indeed, we find
that the mean probability of volunteering tracks the predictions
of a formal equilibrium model, which uses relatedness to weight
and integrate the other person’s outcomes with one’s own
(Archetti, 2009). When social distance is zero, the model assumes
that players care for the outcomes of the other player as much as
they do for their own.
Our findings suggest that many pairs of close individuals
will end up with the same outcome, the R payoff for mutual
volunteering, although they would have fared better if their
probability of volunteering had been lower. It is not clear yet
whether this effect is large enough so that individuals can gain
insight into its non-optimality. Perhaps they will focus instead
on the equality of their two payoffs, consider it fair, and find
reassurance in the successful avoidance of the most aversive
outcome of mutual defection (Leliveld et al., 2009). Alternatively,
our findings point toward a mistaken sense of altruism (Krueger,
2011; Oakley et al., 2011), which, under certain conditions,
can do great harm. For instance, when individual and group
identities fuse, the eagerness to act prosocially can beget tragedy
(Whitehouse et al., 2014).
Now consider the relevance of the findings regarding
expectations of volunteering. With pain at stake, people expect
close others to volunteer, and even over-volunteer. Why do
respondents not scale back their own probability of volunteering
to restore maximum efficiency? The logic of social projection
suggests an answer (Krueger, 2013). Consider a person who
is ready to volunteer and who expects others to do the same.
This person cannot switch from ‘volunteer’ to ‘defect’ without
assuming that others will do the same. If projection is a valid
heuristic for inferring the actions of others, it is valid regardless of
one’s particular strategy. Like prosocial behavior, social projection
decreases over social distance (Robbins and Krueger, 2005); this
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general finding emerges in the present data too (Studies 1 and 2)
and thus helps explain the tenacity of over-volunteering among
close individuals.
If – as we believe – respondents generated their expectations
about the likely behavior of others after they had made their
own decisions, we can make sense of a final finding: respondents
thought that the probability of others to volunteer was lower
than their own. With volunteering being a socially desirable act,
declaring oneself to be more willing to volunteer than others
amounts to a better-than-average-effect (Alicke and Sedikides,
2009). Self-enhancers claim dual moral credit (Heck and Krueger,
2016). They not only volunteer but also predict that they volun-
teer more than others do. Self-enhancement is consistent with
the general projective pattern (Heck and Krueger, 2015). If
respondents derive expectations about others from their own
decisions, these expectations should be more regressive (i.e., less
extreme) than own decisions (Moore and Healy, 2008). Indeed,
expectations were overall closer to the 50% mark than were
judgments of own intended volunteering.
In light of the bounded rationality with which people approach
the VoD, we may ask what options exist for efficient solutions.
In contrast to the prisoner’s dilemma and the assurance game,
but like the game of chicken (Van Lange et al., 2014), the VoD
yields best results if the two players act differently. Over repeated
encounters, turn-taking in volunteering yields mutual benefits. In
a one-shot episode, however, communication is of little help. If
both individuals declare their intention to volunteer (or defect),
additional factors must be brought in to break the tie. One
reasonable social rule is to put the burden of volunteering on
whomever can afford it the most (Przepiorka and Diekmann,
2013). When Linda and Laura reach for the lunch bill, jobless
Linda may yield to working Laura (Abele et al., 2014). When there
is no difference in wealth, timing is critical. Whoever announces
their decision first forces the other to do the opposite (Schelling,
1960). We suspect that in such a sequential arrangement social
distance will remain a moderating factor.
Open Questions
Our study designs reflect choices made under constraints
and in the interest of expediency. Future research needs to
identify and test pinpoint hypotheses to sharpen our theoretical
understanding of the volunteer’s dilemma and to enhance the
generalizability of the findings.
First, there is the finding that over-volunteering occurred only
for aversive outcomes. It may be too soon to declare valence a
robust moderator as we had only one sample with a positive game
frame. If, however, the valence effect survives further testing, we
may note that the departure from rationality and adpativeness
occurred where participants would arguably be most motivated
to avoid it: in the domain of pain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984;
Baumeister et al., 2001).
Second, the task of mapping the effects of social distance
onto the predictions of a rational equilibrium model limited
us to a artificial methodology. To scale social distance with
precision, we sacrificed the real-life experience of encountering
others in the dilemma. As future research meets the challenge
of mundane realism, it will be critical to remain wary of
confounds. Individuated partners will introduce a host of
additional information or assumptions that might increase the
variability of results in random or systematic ways.
Third, the use of five levels of social distance presented in non-
random order may raise the specter of experimental demand.
Yet, we remain sanguine because the demand hypothesis makes
no specific predictions. What particular slope or which specific
intercept, for example, should a respondent feel called upon to
produce when scaling her own willingness to volunteer onto
social distance?
Fourth, we presented the VoD as a choice problem of the
type used in scenario research in the psychology of judgment
and decision-making (see, for example, Murnighan et al., 1993,
or Kim and Murnighan, 1997, for such work on the VoD).
In contrast, behavioral economics prizes consumable payoffs.
Recent work in our laboratory suggests that in the VoD, symbolic
payoffs yield the same results as material ones do (Krueger et al.,
2016, unpublished).
Many ordinary people and the scientists who study them
operate from the simple, reasonable, and adaptive heuristic that
prosocial behavior is socially desirable. Their moral concerns take
the form of asking what can be done to make such behavior more
common. Our excursion into the volunteer’s dilemma suggests
structural and psychological factors can combine to undercut the
effects of good intentions and expectations. More is not always
better.
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